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Abstract This paper presents a new approach to the class-theoretic paradoxes. In
the first part of the paper, I will distinguish classes from sets, describe the function
of class talk, and present several reasons for postulating type-free classes. This
involves applications to the problem of unrestricted quantification, reduction of
properties, natural language semantics, and the epistemology of mathematics. In the
second part of the paper, I will present some axioms for type-free classes. My
approach is loosely based on the Go¨del–Russell idea of limited ranges of signifi-
cance. It is shown how to derive the second-order Dedekind–Peano axioms within
that theory. I conclude by discussing whether the theory can be used as a solution to
the problem of unrestricted quantification. In an appendix, I prove the consistency of
the class theory relative to Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory.
Keywords Classes  Sets  Second-order arithmetic  Unrestricted quantification 
Logicism
1 Sets versus classes
Russell’s paradox of the class of all non-self-membered classes was first discovered
in connection with Frege’s Grundgesetze (Frege 1964), where Frege sought to
establish the logicist thesis that arithmetic is a branch of logic. The paradox caused
(together with other paradoxes such as Cantor’s and Burali-Forti’s) what some have
called the ‘‘third foundational crisis of mathematics’’, which prompted the search
for a firm foundation of mathematics (Fraenkel and Bar-Hillel 1958, pp. 14–15).
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This foundation was found in modern axiomatic set theory, which has its roots in the
work of Cantor.
A number of authors (Maddy 1983; Lavine 1994) have argued that there were at
least two different notions of class in the literature, and that only of them is prone to
paradox (Go¨del 1983). Following Lavine (1994, p. 63), we may call them the
logical and the combinatorial notion of class, respectively.
According to the logical notion, a class may be defined as the extension of a
concept or predicate, or, to use Russell’s words, ‘‘as all the terms satisfying some
propositional function’’.1 Such classes are associated with some kind of definition or
rule that tells us in a principled way whether an object belongs to the class or not.
This is the notion of class that was championed by Frege, Peano and Russell.2
Extensions of concepts had been part of logic since antiquity; they can be found in
the works of Leibniz and are explicit in the Port-Royal Logic (Bochenski 2002, pp.
302–303). It is this fact that allowed Frege, dialectically, to assume that a reduction
of number theory to class theory is sufficient to establish his thesis that arithmetic is
a branch of logic (Heck 2011b, p. 126).
According to the combinatorial notion, on the other hand, classes are obtained
from some well-defined objects such as the natural numbers by ‘enumerating’ their
members in an arbitrary way. Such classes exist independently of our ability to
provide a defining condition or rule that characterizes its members. Arguably, this is
the notion adopted by Cantor and Zermelo and which underlies our modern iterative
concept of set.
The difference between the concept of class as given by a rule and the concept of
class freed from such restriction was an important factor in the controversy about
the axiom of choice. This axiom states that we can select one element out of each of
a family of (non-empty) classes and collect them into one class. As Bernays (1983)
remarks, the axiom of choice ‘‘is an immediate application of the combinatorial
concepts in question.’’ On the logical notion of class, on the other hand, it is
doubtful whether a class satisfying the requirements set out in the axiom of choice
can always be found.3
In what follows, we will call the combinatorial classes sets and the logical ones
classes. The (logical) notion of class motivates what is commonly referred to as
‘‘the naı¨ve calculus’’, which consists in the naı¨ve or unrestricted comprehension
axiom scheme, which postulates the existence of a class corresponding to each
predicate, and the axiom of extensionality, which states that two classes are
identical if they have the same members. Of course, as Russell’s paradox shows, the
1 A propositional function is a function that yields a proposition when given an argument, and one might
think of them as being abstracted from propositions which are primarily given. In particular, a
propositional function is not to be confused with the predicate (i.e., formula with one free variable)
expressing it.
2 Two important remarks are in order. First, while Frege and Russell were logicists, Peano was not
(despite frequent claims to the contrary). See Kennedy (1963). Second, there are important differences
between Frege’s and Peano–Russell’s notion of class. For example, while for Russell classes are
‘‘composed of terms’’, for Frege the elements of a class do not seem to be constitutive of it. See Lavine
(1994, pp. 63–64). Our own account will remain neutral between the two.
3 See Russell’s (1973) discussion of how to divide an infinity of boots into two classes.
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naı¨ve calculus is inconsistent. The standard approach to the class-theoretic
paradoxes is to be found in the theory of types, which originated with Russell
(1903a, 1908). In a nutshell, what happens here is that one abandons the idea of a
general or unrestricted variable and replaces it with a series of variables
differentiated as to type.
While Cantor never laid down explicitly the principles that he was working with, it
has been argued that the naı¨ve comprehension axiom schemewas not part of it and that
the notion of set was never subject to the paradoxes (e.g., Lavine 1994). By contrast,
one can make a case that the class-theoretic paradoxes are still unsolved. For instance,
Go¨del says about the type-theoretic approach that ‘‘it cannot satisfy the condition of
including the concept of concept which applies to itself or the universe of all classes
that belong to themselves. To take such a hierarchy as the theory of concepts is an
example of trying to eliminate the intensional paradoxes in an arbitrary manner.’’
(Wang 1996, p. 278) The aim of this paper is to provide reasons for developing a type-
free theory of classes and to indicate one way how this might be done.
2 The function of class talk
In a series of papers, Parsons (1982, 1983a, b) has argued that the introduction of the
notion of class answers a general need to generalize on predicate places in our
language (where ‘predicate’ means formula with one free variable). For example,
consider the usual (first-order) principle of mathematical induction. This consists in
all sentences of the form
uð0Þ ^ 8n ðuðnÞ ! uðnþ 1ÞÞ ! 8nuðnÞ
where uðxÞ is a predicate applying to numbers. The introduction of class terms,
governed by the comprehension axiom scheme, allows us to substitute the
expression uðtÞ by the materially equivalent t 2 fu j uðuÞg, where fu j uðuÞg
occupies an object position and is therefore open to (objectual) quantification.
Hence, the notion of class allows us to finitely axiomatize the induction schema by
the single statement
8y ð0 2 y ^ 8n ðn 2 y ! nþ 1 2 yÞ ! 8n n 2 yÞ
Of course, in mathematical contexts the demand for generalising predicate places is
met to a considerable extent by sets. But the notion of class allows us in addition to
generalize every predicate in the language of set theory. This cannot be done by sets
themselves because some predicates of the language of set theory, such as ‘x is an
ordinal’, have extensions that are ‘‘too big to be sets’’. Examples of the use of
classes in set theory include the formulation of certain schemata as single state-
ments, such as the axiom schemes of separation and replacement, or reflection
principles.4 There are many other uses as well that are often eliminable but seem
4 Some philosophers have objected to interpreting second-order variables as ranging over classes (often
understood as one additional layer of sets) because set theory is supposed to be a theory about all set-like
entities, e.g., Boolos (1984). But classes, in the logical sense, need not be understood as set-like entities
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heuristically indispensable, for example, in connection with the study of elementary
embeddings of the universe of sets into some inner model of ZFC (see Uzquiano
2003, section 2).
The function of class talk brings the notion of class in proximity with the notions
of truth and truth-of (satisfaction). This was stressed by Parsons: just as the notion of
class answers a need to generalize predicate places, so does the notion of truth
answer to a need to generalize sentence places (cf. Quine 1970). Moreover, Parsons
(1983b) observes that the notion of satisfaction can be seen a means to generalize
predicate places as well, and that the usual predicative theories of satisfaction and
classes are mutually interpretable. In Schindler (2015, 2017) it is shown that even
impredicative theories of classes can be interpreted in (type-free) theories of
satisfaction. Given the similar functions of the notions of truth and class, and the
mentioned interpretability results, this suggests that someone who already has a
broadly deflationary understanding of the notions of truth and satisfaction should
probably have a deflationary understanding of the notion of class as well.
While I find the idea of a deflationary account of classes intriguing, it is rather
tangential to our present purposes and I won’t pursue it any further here. But let me
make the following remark. That classes were merely introduced to fulfill a particular
function does not imply a nominalistic account of classes, at least if one subscribes to
Quine’s criterion of ontological commitment. On the contrary, classes are introduced
so that we can objectually quantify over entities that would otherwise be in predicate
position. However, a deflationary account of classes may help us argue that classes are
‘‘thin’’ objects in the sense of Linnebo (2012), where ‘‘thin’’ is taken in the sense that
‘‘very little is required for their existence’’. But this is a task for another paper.
3 Reasons for postulating type-free classes
The literature is full of interesting attempts to overcome the restrictions imposed by the
theory of types. For an overview, I send the reader to Cantini (2009). The are various
reasons why one may be interested in a type-free theory of classes. For instance,
Feferman (1977, 1984), Muller (2001) and others are interested in a set-or class-
theoretic foundation of category theory. The problem here is that there are certain
categories that are very natural to think about, such as the category of all sets, the
category of all groups or the category of all categories, that cannot be formed in
standard set theory. [For a recent overview, see Schulman (2008).] In what follows, I
will list four more reasons. My own interests are mainly with the first and last of them.
3.1 Unrestricted quantification
There are certain contexts in logic and philosophy where we intend our quantifiers
to range over absolutely everything whatsoever, or at least to be unrestricted, for
Footnote 4 continued
(collections) at all (as remarked in footnote 2, Frege did not think of extensions as being constituted by
their members). Moreover, if type-free classes are collections, then set theory is certainly not about them.
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example when we say that everything is self-identical or that the empty set has no
members. Presented with a counterexample, we would not regard it open to the
defendant to dismiss the counterexample on the ground that it is not in the domain
of quantification. The possibility of unrestricted quantification does not only seem to
be plausible, its denial seems to border on the incoherent. If someone claims that
one cannot quantify over everything, they seem to imply at the same time that there
is something one cannot quantify over (Williamson 2003).
Despite this, the coherence of unrestricted quantification has been doubted. For
an overview of this debate, see Rayo and Uzquiano (2006). One objection is related
to a principle that was first discussed (but not endorsed) by Cartwright (1994), and is
nowadays known as the
All-in-One Principle The objects in a domain of discourse make up a set or
some set-like object.
In modern semantics, for example, the domain of discourse is usually taken to be a
set. However, according to standard set theory there is no universal set. This causes
problems, in particular, when one tries to interpret set-theoretic talk itself. It seems
natural to assume that when a set theorist talks about sets, she is (at least sometimes)
talking about all sets. The proposal that we should trade in standard set theory for a
theory that admits a universal set, such as Quine’s New Foundations (Quine 1980),
has not been met with enthusiasm, because this theory does not seem to embody any
intuitive picture of sets.
One popular defence of unrestricted quantification makes use of the theory of
types. On this account, interpretations are not (first-order) objects but higher-order
entities. But this defence is not unproblematic; see Sect. 4 below and Linnebo
(2006, pp. 154–156). Therefore, one may think it is preferable to treat the domain of
quantification as an (first-order) object. As Linnebo points out, there is no reason to
assume that this object needs to be a set. Hence, one possible solution to the
problem of unrestricted quantification consists in replacing or supplementing set
theory by a theory of classes that allows for a universal class. This proposal is not
unproblematic itself, because theories with a universal class are incompatible with
the axiom of separation, which seems necessary for semantics. I believe, however,
that this problem can be dealt with and will return to it in Sect. 6.
3.2 Reduction of properties
Another area where classes might be useful is metaphysics: one might try to reduce
properties or universals to classes. An influential account of this sort was given by
Lewis (1986, chap. 1.5). However, there a good reasons, mainly in connection with
the semantics of natural language (see below), to assume that properties need to be
type-free.5
5 Of course, one may deny that properties are reducible to classes. But given the formal similarities
between classes and properties mentioned in Sect. 2, advances in formal theories of classes and the
analysis of the class-theoretic paradoxes can guide us in developing formal theories of properties.
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Another motive for self-membered properties was suggested by Allen (2016 pp.
28–31). One classical problem confronting property theory is Bradley’s Regress
argument. This argument can be described as follows. Assume that a instantiates the
universal or property F. This relation of instantiation is itself a universal, say I1.
Now, one might ask what connects a, F and I1? This will be another instantiation
relation, I2. But then we may ask what connects a;F; I1 and I2? This will be another
instantiation relation, I3. And so on. Whether this regress is vicious or not is a hotly
debated topic.
Whatever the outcome, one might try to simplify the hierarchy of instantiation
relations required by the regress. There are at least two options: one could treat
I1; I2; I3; . . . as instances of a single multigrade relation I
0 (where a relation is
multigrade if the number of entities it relates can vary); or, one could treat
I1; I2; I3; . . . as so-called inexactly resembling instances of a single instantiation
relation I (where instances of a relation inexactly resemble each other if the
resemblance is not exact similarity). Either way, I0 and I need to be able to self-
instantiate.
3.3 Natural language semantics
Classes (properties, concepts) have been applied in the analysis of natural language
semantics (Montague 1974). However, there are many intuitively valid inferences
that cannot be reconstructed in a typed framework due to the lack of self-
exemplifying properties; this has motivated quite some research into type-free
theories of properties (Bealer 1982; Menzel 1986, 1993; Orilia 1999; Chierchia and
Turner 1988). For example, consider the inference from
1. Everything has the property of being self-identical
to
2. Socrates has the property of being self-identical
and the inference from (1) to
3. The property of being red has the property of being self-identical
The intuitive soundness of both inferences requires not only the existence of the
property of being red but also that the quantifier in (1) ranges over both Socrates and
the property in question. Hence, this inference cannot be captured in a typed
language.
3.4 Reduction of mathematics
Last, but not least, one might be interested in a theory of classes (properties) for the
very same reason for which Frege and Russell were originally drawn to it, namely,
the ‘‘reduction of mathematics to logic’’. It has often been claimed that logicism is
dead, but several reformed versions of logicism have emerged in recent decades.
One should mention here, on the one hand, the works of Bealer (1982), Cocchiarella
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(1986), Landini (2004), and Orilia (1991), which are based on type-free theories of
properties, and, on the other hand, the works of the Neo-Fregean school, which are
based on abstraction principles. For a technical overview of the latter, see Burgess
(2005). For philosophical discussion, see Hale and Wright (2001), Heck (2011a),
and Cook (2009). The Neo-Fregean project originated with the discovery of Frege’s
Theorem, namely, that the second-order Dedekind–Peano axioms for arithmetic can
be derived, in second-order logic, from what is known as ‘‘Hume’s Principle’’,
namely
8F8Gð#F ¼ #G $ EqðF;GÞÞ
This principle states that the numbers of Fs is identical to the number of Gs if and
only if the Fs and Gs are equinumerous (i.e., can be put in a one-one
correspondence).
Now, one might be sceptical about the analyticity of Hume’s Principle or whether
class theory should be counted as part of logic. But such reductions may still be seen
as answering to Frege’s question: How are numbers given to us? The problem of
epistemic access to abstract objects has been emphasized by Benacerraf (1983).
How can we have knowledge of abstract objects, such as numbers, when we have no
causal interactions with such objects? Wright’s idea is that an agent who is capable
of second-order reasoning but has no knowledge of number theory could stumble
upon Hume’s Principle, say, in a dream and decide to use terms of the form #F in
accordance with it. Then the claim is that the agent thereby acquires a concept of
number without significant epistemological presupposition.
Similarly, one may claim that the concept of class (property) is acquired without
significant epistemological presupposition. We ‘‘nominalize’’ predicates in order to
generalize predicate places, and that’s all there is to class (property) talk. However,
if we want to reduce mathematics to a theory of classes, then type-free classes are
called for, because we need to initiate a boot-strapping process in order to generate
enough objects that can serve as proxies for mathematical objects.
4 Ranges of significance
The purpose of the present section is to motivate a novel approach to the paradoxes
that is loosely based on some remarks that Go¨del made in (Go¨del 1983) about
Russell’s theory of types. Recall that a propositional function is a function that
yields a proposition when given an argument. According to Russell’s theory, every
propositional function uðxÞ has ‘‘in addition to its range of truth a range of
significance, i.e., a range within which x must lie if uðxÞ is to be a proposition at all,
whether true or false’’ (Russell 1903b, p. 523). More generally, the range of
significance of a function is the collection of arguments for which said function is
defined (i.e., has a value), and the range of significance of a propositional function is
the collection of arguments for which the function yields a proposition. The idea of
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a range of significance need not be tied to the notion of propositional function.
Go¨del applies it to concepts,6 but of course one can also apply it to predicates.
There are several ways in which the notion of a range of significance can be
interpreted on a pre-theoretical level. The literature on philosophy of language
provides many examples of grammatically well-formed sentences that, for some
reason or other, do not express a proposition or lack a definite truth value. Many of
these examples may be taken as instances of an object’s being a singular point of the
relevant predicate or propositional function. For example, one may think that in the
case of a category mistake (e.g., ‘‘The number 2 is green’’), the object denoted by
the name lies outside the range of significance of the predicate. Of course, one may
simply treat such a sentence as false and its negation as true (perhaps for reasons of
technical simplicity, e.g., in order to stay classical). On a more narrow
understanding, one may think that in all and only those cases where the application
of a predicate to a name yields a paradoxical sentence (e.g., ‘‘This sentence is
false’’), the object denoted by the name lies outside the range of significance of the
predicate.
As Go¨del remarks, the idea that every propositional function has a range of
significance that need not exhaust the entire universe ‘‘brings in a new idea for the
solution of the paradoxes, especially suited to their intentional form’’, which
‘‘consists in blaming the paradoxes not on the axiom that every propositional
function defines a concept or class, but on the assumption that every concept gives a
meaningful proposition, if asserted for any arbitrary object or objects as arguments’’
(1983, p. 466). He adds that ‘‘[t]he obvious objection that every concept can be
extended to all arguments, by defining another one which gives a false proposition
whenever the original one was meaningless, can easily be dealt with by pointing out
that the concept ‘‘meaningfully applicable’’ need not itself be always meaningfully
applicable’’ (otherwise Grelling’s paradox would ensue).
For reasons that I do not want to enter here, Russell thought that ranges of
significance form types such that whenever a propositional function is significant for
some argument x, and y belongs to the same type as x, then that function is
significant for the argument y as well. This means that
1. whenever a propositional function is significant for some argument x, its range
of significance is identical with the type of x;
2. sameness of type is an equivalence relation and, therefore, types are mutually
exclusive; and
3. if two functions are both significant for some argument x, then they must have
exactly the same range of significance.
The types are then divided into orders (yielding the ramified theory of types), but
this further complication need not interest us here. Unfortunately, the theory of
types suffers from expressive limitations that have often been pointed out in the
literature. For example, Go¨del remarks that ‘‘[w]hat makes the above principle
particularly suspect, however, is that its very assumption makes its formulation as a
6 See Crocco (2006) for more on Go¨del’s account of concepts.
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meaningful proposition impossible, because x and y must then be confined to
definite ranges of significance which are either the same or different, and in both
cases the statement does not express the principle or even part of it.’’ (Go¨del
1983, p. 466)
It should be observed that Russell’s idea that every propositional function has a
range of significance is logically independent of the assumption that the ranges of
significance form types. One might therefore consider the possibility of construing
classes based on the first but without the second assumption. In the remainder of this
paper, I wish to develop the theory of classes in this direction. This approach is
inspired by Go¨del’s remark that:
It is not impossible that the idea of limited ranges of significance could be
carried out without the above restrictive principle [i.e. that the ranges of
significance form types]. It might even turn out that it is possible to assume
every concept to be significant everywhere except for certain ‘‘singular
points’’ or ‘‘limiting points’’, so that the paradoxes appear as something
analogous to dividing by zero. Such a system would be most satisfactory in the
following respect: our logical intuitions would then remain correct up to
certain minor corrections, i.e., they could then be considered to give an
essentially correct, only somewhat ‘blurred’ picture of the real state of affairs.
Unfortunately the attempts made in this direction have failed so far; on the
other hand, the impossibility of this scheme has not been proved either, in
spite of the strong inconsistency results of Kleene and Rosser. (Go¨del 1983, p.
466-467)
The following general picture emerges. Let U be the universe of all objects, and
uðxÞ be some propositional function. uðxÞ has a range of significance, RðuÞ, which
is a subset of U. If uðxÞ has singular points, then RðuÞ is a proper subset of U. For
every object a in RðuÞ, uðaÞ is meaningful—that is, true or false. uðxÞ thereby
determines two classes, the extension fa 2 RðuÞ j uðaÞg and anti-extension fa 2
RðuÞ j :uðaÞg of uðxÞ, whose union coincides with RðuÞ, that is,
fa 2 RðuÞ j uðaÞg [ fa 2 RðuÞ j :uðaÞg ¼ RðuÞ
Go¨del mentions Church’s (inconsistent) system (Church 1932) as an interesting
attempt to carry out these ideas. Another possibility is to use some non-classical
logic, such as the Weak or Strong Kleene logics. This route faces the notorious
problem that the material conditional is not well behaved in these logics. One might
therefore consider the following alternative route, which retains classical logic.
Again, let U be the universe of all objects, and uðxÞ be some propositional
function. As before, uðxÞ has a range of significance, RðuÞ, which is a subset of U.
If uðxÞ has singular points, then RðuÞ is a proper subset of U. This time, however,
we treat uðaÞ as meaningful (i.e., true or false) for every object a in U. As before,
uðxÞ determines two classes, the extension fa 2 RðuÞ j uðaÞg and anti-extension
fa 2 RðuÞ j :uðaÞg of uðxÞ, whose union coincides with RðuÞ. The difference to
the previous picture is that the classes fa 2 RðuÞ j uðaÞg and fa 2 RðuÞ j :uðaÞg
may ‘‘underspill’’: if a is an object outside the range of uðxÞ, then either uðaÞ or
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:uðaÞ will be true; but since a is a singularity of uðxÞ, it is neither an element of
fa 2 RðuÞ j uðaÞg nor of fa 2 RðuÞ j :uðaÞg.
It is the latter route that will be followed in the remainder of this paper.7 For
technical convenience, I will modify the picture above in two ways. First, I will treat
classes as extensions of predicates (i.e., formulas with one free variable) rather than
propositional functions (or concepts) because I am not aware of any suitable theory
of propositional functions (concepts). Second, instead of assigning ranges of
significance to predicates, I will directly assign them to classes. This saves us the
trouble of introducing names for predicates and function symbols for syntactic
operations on predicates. From a technical point of view, this does not seem to make
too much of a difference, because to every predicate uðxÞ there corresponds a
unique class abstract fx j uðxÞg. The class abstract can therefore serve as some form
of Go¨del code for the predicate. In the informal presentation, I will nevertheless talk
frequently (as a form of shorthand) of the range of significance of u instead of that
of fx j uðxÞg.
5 A type-free theory of classes
The language of the theory that we are going to present is an ordinary one-sorted
first-order language with identity. It contains a binary relation symbol, 2, for
membership in a class. One of the expressive limitations of the theory of types is
that it cannot express that some object is not in the range of significance of some
propositional function (or predicate). In order not to fall prey to the same objection,
we will introduce a primitive binary relation symbol, R, into our language. We may
read xRy as ‘‘x is in the range of significance of y’’ or ‘‘x is not a singular point
(singularity) of y’’. Let total(x) abbreviate the formula 8z zRx. If x is total, then x has
an unrestricted range of significance (i.e., has no singular points). According to the
theory that we are going to present, every predicate determines a class. We will
therefore assume that our language contains a class term fu j ug for every formula
u containing the free variable u. Since we are aiming at a type-free system, u is
allowed to contain 2;R and other class terms. Moreover, it may contain other free
variables as parameters.
A remark on notation. I will use u;w for well-formed formulas, u, v, x, y, z for
variables, and s, t for arbitrary terms. Some special symbols will be introduced as
we go along. uðt=xÞ denotes the result of substituting all free occurrences of x in u
by t. Instead of : s 2 t we will also write s 62 t. The usual conventions for the use of
brackets apply.
The axioms can be divided into three groups. The first group consists of
‘conceptual’ axioms that describe the general relation between a class and its range
of significance. These axioms are directly suggested by the picture provided in the
previous section (i.e., that every predicate, together with its range of significance,
7 This should not be understood as a judgement in favour of a classical solution. A non-classical solution
may be preferable if one could come up with a natural system that sufficient proof-theoretic strength. My
own attempts in this direction have failed so far.
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determines an extension and anti-extension in the indicated way). The second group
of axioms describe the relation between the range of significance of a predicate and
the logical form of that predicate. They are based on the natural assumption that
classes/ranges of significance should be closed under the algebraic operations
corresponding to the logical operations on predicates. The third group contains only
one axiom expressing the wide-spread idea that the paradoxes are to be blamed on
some form of circularity or non-well-foundedness, a view that goes back at least to
the days of Russell. These axioms belong to the pure theory of classes, i.e., the part
that deals with classes of classes; at the end of this section, we will discuss an axiom
for the applied theory of classes, i.e., classes of individuals or urelements.
Our first and most basic axiom scheme is a relativized form of naı¨ve
comprehension and follows immediately from the picture presented in the previous
section. The axiom states that whenever x is in the range of significance of the
predicate u (or equivalently: whenever x is not a singularity of u), then x is an
element of the class fu j ug if and only if uðx=uÞ holds. That is:
Axiom Class Comprehension
∀x xR{u | ϕ} → (x ∈ {u | ϕ} ↔ ϕ(x/u))
where ϕ is any formula and x is free for u in ϕ.
Notice that u may contain free variables besides u. These should be bound by
universal quantifiers. A similar remark applies to the other axioms below.
The axiom scheme is completely general and topic-neutral. We can insert any
formula in place of u, including the predicates u ¼ u; u 62 u and uRu.
It is easily seen that the Axiom of Class Comprehension is consistent. Being a
universally quantified conditional, we can make it vacuously true. In this
framework, Russell’s paradox is simply transformed into the theorem that the
Russell class r :¼ fu j u 62 ug does not lie in its own range of significance: Carrying
out the usual reasoning, we convince ourselves that
rRr ! ðr 2 r $ r 62 rÞ
from which we simply conclude that : rRr. No contradiction ensues.
Our second axiom, which also follows from the picture provided in the previous
section, states that if x is a singular point of y, then x is not an element of y:
Axiom Singularity
∀x (¬xRy → ¬x ∈ y)
In conjunction with the Axiom of Class Comprehension, the Axiom of Singularity
implies:
8x ðx 2 fu j ug ! uðx=uÞÞ ðOutÞ
This is a very useful theorem. If we know that x is an element of the class y, then we
can deduce that x satisfies the defining condition of y. Moreover, this theorem rules
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out that some classes ‘‘overspill’’: it is not possible that the class fu j ug contains
some objects that are not us.
We adopt the following version of extensionality, according to which two classes
are identical if they have the same range of significance and the same members.
(The other direction follows from the logical laws of identity.)
Axiom Extensionality
∀x∀y (R(x) = R(y) ∧ ∀z (z ∈ x ↔ z ∈ y) → x = y)
Here, RðxÞ ¼ RðyÞ is shorthand for 8z ðzRx $ xRyÞ. The reason for imposing this
condition is as follows. Assume it is possible to define a class w such that
w ¼ fu j u 62 u ^ u ¼ wg. (Such self-referential classes cannot be defined in the
present formalism, but one may muse about extensions of the system in which this is
possible.) It is easy to prove, using the first two axioms, that w 62 w. Hence, w has no
members. Now assume that the class£ :¼ fu j u 6¼ ug has an unrestricted range of
significance. (This will actually follows from our other axioms.) Hence, if we
identified classes with the same members, we would get that £ ¼ w. But then
w would have an unrestricted range of significance as well, which we have just ruled
out. (It should be noted that, as things stand, the ordinary axiom of extensionality is
consistent with our theory as well.)
The Axiom of Extensionality (in either form) will not be used in any of the
theorems below. The reason to include it, apart from conceptual considerations, is
merely to highlight that it can be included without leading to triviality. This seems
noteworthy because there are well-known problems for adding axioms of
extensionality to non-classical logics that contain naı¨ve comprehension (Field
2008, pp. 296–298).
It is perhaps interesting to remark that, given the first three axioms, we can
characterize classes with the following abstraction principle (scheme), which states
that the class of us is identical to the class of ws if and only if u and w have the
same range of significance and are satisfied by exactly the same objects:
fu j ug ¼ fu j wg $ Rfu j ug ¼ Rfu j wg ^ 8xðuðxÞ $ wðxÞÞ
The above abstraction principle is a theorem of our theory. In contrast to ordinary
abstraction principles, in the above scheme the class terms appear also on the right-
hand side of the biconditional. Of course, this is a side-effect of my decision to use
classes, instead of predicates, as the second relatum of the R relation. If predicates
were used instead, the abstraction terms would only occur on the left-hand side of
the abstraction principle.
Our next group of axioms deals with the relation between the range of
significance of a predicate and the logical form of that predicate. They are based on
the natural assumption that classes/ranges of significance should be closed under the
algebraic operations corresponding to the logical operations on predicates. For
example, if the number 2 lies in the range of significance of ‘‘is green’’, then it
should lie within the range of ‘‘is not green’’ as well; if Aristotle lies in the range of
T. Schindler
123
significance of the predicates ‘‘is Greek’’ and ‘‘is a philosopher’’, then Aristotle
should also lie within the range of ‘‘is a Greek philosopher’’.
Axiom Negation, Connectives
∀x (xR{u | ϕ} → xR{u | ¬ϕ})
∀x (xR{u | ϕ} ∧ xR{u | ψ} → xR{u | ϕ Jψ})
where J ∈ {∧,∨,→}
We will adopt similar axioms for atomic predicates. For example, consider the
atomic predicate u 2 t, where t denotes some class. Of what objects should we say
that they lie in the range of significance of u 2 t? Intuitively, t simply is fu j u 2 tg.
Hence, the following seems natural: if x is an object that already lies in the range of
significance of t, then x lies in the range of u 2 t as well.8
Axiom Membership, Identity
∀x∀y (xRy → xR{u | u ∈ y})
∀x∀y (xRy → xR{u | u = y})
The axioms introduced so far are compatible with every predicate having an empty
range of significance. (Note that all of them are universally quantified conditionals.)
They are therefore trivially consistent. In order to get our theory off the ground, we
need some axioms that ensure that some predicates have non-empty ranges. The
following axiom stipulates that the (class determined by the) predicate u ¼ u has an
unrestricted range of significance. Recall that total(x) abbreviates the formula
8z zRx.
Axiom Self-Identity
total({u | u = u})
The reason for postulating this axiom is clear, given our motives. We want to design
a theory in which models with a universal domain are available. Instead of adopting
the Axiom of Self-Identity, we could stipulate that the empty class £ :¼ fu j u 6¼
ug is total. Given that ranges of significance are preserved under negation, it does
not matter which one we choose. The totality of one follows from the the totality of
the other.
8 Indeed, it seems natural to strengthen the Axioms of Negation, Connectives, Membership and Identity
to a biconditional. This is consistent with the other axioms.
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I find the Axiom of Self-Identity fairly innocuous. First, the predicate x ¼ x (just
as any other tautological predicate) is stable (i.e., its extension is fixed on every
interpretation of the non-logical primitives). Second, the predicate x ¼ x does not
contain the membership symbol 2, and should therefore be admissible. One might
compare this line of argument to how the T-schema is restricted in formal theories
of truth. The sentences without the truth predicate are always assumed to be
admissible instances of the T-schema.
Before presenting the last axiom of the pure theory of classes, let me mention
some straightforward consequences of the axioms introduced so far. I hope this will
help the reader to get a better feeling for the theory.
First, observe that, as desired, the universal class V :¼ fu j u ¼ ug contains every
class, including itself and the Russell class r. For by the Axiom of Class
Comprehension, we have
xRV ! ðx 2 V $ x ¼ xÞ
By the Axiom of Self-Identity, we know that xRV for every x. Hence, x 2 V for
every x.
Second, since the Russell class r is contained in the universal class but not vice
versa (as the reader may easily verify), we can conclude (by usual laws of identity)
that V 6¼ r. This is in stark contrast to the traditional theories of ‘‘proper classes’’
(i.e., theories of the Morse-Kelley variety), which do not distinguish the two.
Next, we notice that total classes are closed under the following operations.
Assume that t1; . . .; tn are total. Then:
1. ft1; . . .; tng :¼ fu j u ¼ t1 _ . . . _ u ¼ tng is total.
2. ðt1; t2Þ :¼ fft1g; ft1; t2gg is total.
3. t1 [ t2 :¼ fu j u 2 t1 _ u 2 t2g is total.
4. t1 \ t2 :¼ fu j u 2 t1 ^ u 2 t2g is total.
5. t1 n t2 :¼ fu j u 2 t1 ^ u 62 t2g is total.
6. t1 :¼ fu j u 62 t1g is total.
7. Sðt1Þ :¼ t1 [ ft1g is total.
8. t1 [ ft2g is total.
For illustrative purposes, I show (3). The other items are proved in a similar fashion.
By the Axiom of Membership and the totality of t1, 8xðxRfu j u 2 t1gÞ. Similarly,
we have 8xðxRfu j u 2 t2gÞ. Therefore, by the Axiom of Connectives, we have
8x ðxRfu j u 2 t1 _ u 2 t2gÞ;
which means that t1 [ t2 is total.
Using item (7), we can successively generate the finite ordinals in the usual von
Neumann style. That is, we let 0 :¼£, 1 :¼ f0g, 2 :¼ f0; 1g, 3 :¼ f0; 1; 2g and so
on. It is easily seen that all these classes are total. However, we are not yet able to
collect these classes into one.
By item (8), it follows that total classes are closed under adjunction. This means
that our theory relatively interprets adjunctive set theory (=existence of empty set
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plus closure under adjunction), which in turn interprets Robinson arithmetic
(roughly, Peano arithmetic without the induction scheme).9
It should also be noted that out theory interprets the system known as NF2, whose
axioms are extensionality, existence of the empty set, and closure under
complements, intersections, and singletons (Forster 2001).
This brings us to the most interesting axiom. It expresses the wide-spread idea
that paradoxes are to be blamed on some form of circularity or non-well-
foundedness. More precisely, the axiom states that if x is a singularity of some class,
then x itself has singular points:
Axiom Circularity
∀x (∃y ¬xRy → ∃z ¬ zRx)
For a typical example, consider the Russell class. The Russell class has a singular
point (namely, the Russell class itself), and that singular point has a singular point
itself (namely, the Russell class). And similarly for the Burali-Forti paradox: the
class of all ordinals is a singular point of (the class defined by) the predicate ‘x is an
ordinal’. We need not assume that all paradoxes stem from such a simple type of
circularity. Perhaps there are classes x, y such that x is a singular point of y and vice
versa. We may also imagine a infinitely descending chain of classes x1; x2; x3; . . .
such that every class in that sequence is a singular point of its immediate
predecessor.10
The Axiom of Circularity is logically equivalent to the claim
8x ð8z zRx ! 8y xRyÞ
In words: whenever x is total, then x lies in the range of significance of every class
(i.e., x is not a singularity of any class). Since there are total classes (in fact,
infinitely many ones: our proxies for the natural numbers 0; 1; 2; . . . are all total),
this means that no predicate has an empty range of significance (in fact, every
predicate has infinitely many objects in its range). Thus I believe that the Axiom of
Circularity actually captures to some extent Go¨del’s idea that we may assume every
predicate to be significant for most arguments.
The Axiom of Circularity is quite remarkable. It justifies impredicative class
formation in the sense that it entitles us (in conjunction with the first two axioms) to
form classes of total classes at will. For every predicate u, the following is a
theorem of our theory:
9 A proof of that result (i.e., that Robinson arithmetic is interpretable in adjunctive set theory) can be
found in Visser (2009), who also gives a short history of the result.
10 It would therefore be more appropriate to call the Axiom of Circularity ‘the Axiom of Non-Well-
Foundedness’. The reason I did not choose this name is two-fold. First, the name ‘Axiom of Non-Well-
Foundedness’ could easily lead to a confusion with the Axiom of Anti-Foundation in non-well-founded
set theories. Second, non-well-foundedness can be seen as some form of unfolding of circularity.
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9y 8x ðtotalðxÞ ! ðx 2 y $ uðx=uÞÞÞ
(The usual condition on the variables apply.) This can be seen as follows. The
Axiom of Cirularity implies
8x ðtotalðxÞ ! xRfu j ugÞ
Thus by the Axiom of Class Comprehension we get
8x ðtotalðxÞ ! ðx 2 fu j ug $ uðx=uÞÞÞ; ðSOCÞ
from which the above claim follows by existential weakening.
The Axiom of Circularity boosts the mathematical strength of our theory
significantly. It allows us, using suitable definitions, to derive the second-order
Dedekind–Peano axioms for arithmetic within our theory. Let us define
x :¼ fx j totalðxÞ ^ 8yð0 2 y ^ 8z 2 yðSðzÞ 2 yÞ ! x 2 yÞg;
where 0 and S(z) are defined as above. This states that x is the class of total classes
that are contained in every inductive class, where a class is inductive if it contains 0
and is closed under successor. This is the usual von Neumann definition of natural
numbers; we have only added the condition that the natural numbers must be total.
For illustrative purposes, let us show thatx actually contains all natural numbers (as
defined above). First, we have already seen that 0 (the empty class) is total. Trivially, 0
is contained in every inductive class. Hence, 0 satisfies the defining condition for being
a natural number. But then the scheme (SOC) above allows us to conclude that 0 is
indeed an element of x. Next, let us show that x is closed under successors. So let
x 2 x. Then by (Out) we know that x satisfies the defining condition of x. Hence x is
total and contained in every inductive class. But then it trivially follows that its
successor, S(x), must also be contained in every inductive class. Moreover, we have
seen above that whenever x is total, so is its successor. Hence, S(x) satisfies the defining
condition of being a natural number, and since it is totalwe can conclude that SðxÞ 2 x,
by another application of (SOC). A complete derivation of the second-order
Dedekind–Peano axioms can be found in ‘‘Appendix 1’’.
The theory presented above is consistent. A proof is given in ‘‘Appendix 2’’. It
needs to be stressed that the axioms presented here are only basic axioms that can
and should be extended by additional ones that increase the expressive (mathemat-
ical) power of the theory even more.
So far we have only considered classes of classes, that is pure classes. One of the
main motives for developing a theory of classes lies in its application to some given
domain. So let us assume that our language contains additional predicates applying
to objects other than classes, such as people, stones, numbers or sets, and let us
introduce a distinguished predicate, U (for urelements), applying to these objects.
Then we may adopt the following axiom which states that every urelement is in the
range of significance of every class.11
11 It would perhaps be more natural if we also introduced a predicate, C, applying to all classes, and
reformulated all class axioms slightly, so that e.g. the Axiom of Urelements becomes
8x ðUx ! 8y ðCy ! xRyÞÞ. I leave this as an exercise for the reader.
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Axiom Urelements
∀x (Ux → ∀y xRy)
Now let T be some first-order theory not containing the symbols 2;R;U nor any of
the abstraction terms. If T is the language of set theory, we can simply work with
two copies of 2. Let TU be the theory resulting from T by relativizing all quantifiers
in the axioms of T to the predicate U. Moreover, if T contains axiom schemata (such
as induction or replacement), extend these so that 2;R;U and the abstraction terms
are allowed to occur in the instances of the schemata. Then it is easily seen that TU ,
conjoined with our axioms for classes, implies that
9y 8x ðUx ! ðx 2 y $ uÞÞ
(This follows simply from the Axioms of Urelements and Class Comprehension.)
Hence, TU together with the theory of classes interprets the second-order version of
T.
It is possible to go further. For example, we may add an axiom to the effect that
whenever x is a class containing only urelements, then x is in the range of every
class. This would allow us to interpret the third-order version of T. This process can
be iterated. We can add an axiom to the effect that whenever x is a class of classes of
urelements, then x is in the range of every class, which gives us fourth-order T, and
so on for every finite order. Hence, we can embed the full type hierarchy over T into
our theory of classes.
That this can be done in a type-free theory of classes is something I take as a
minimal adequacy result. We have claimed that a type-free theory needs to be
developed because of certain expressive limitations of type theory. But then the
replacing theory should be at least as expressive as type theory.
There are some theories T that are inconsistent with full second-order
comprehension, e.g., abstraction principles for ordinals conceived as sui generis
objects (Florio and Leach-Krouse 2017). In such cases, one can weaken the Axiom
of Urelements in several ways, if desired. For example, let P1;P2; . . . be the
predicates of T. Then one could replace the Axiom of Urelements with the following
schema:
8xðUx ! xRfu j PiugÞ
In this case, one only obtains comprehension for predicates that are first-order
definable in T, that is, a predicative comprehension principle.
6 Unrestricted quantification
Following a suggestion of Linnebo (2006), I have mentioned that one way to
approach the problem of unrestricted quantification is by adopting a theory with a
universal class or property. An objection that is frequently raised against such
proposals is that theories with universal classes are incompatible with the axiom
scheme of separation,
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8x 9y 8z ðz 2 y $ z 2 x ^ uÞ
This axiom states that given a class x, we can collect all members of x that satisfy
some property u into one class y. But if x is the universal class, and u is the Russell
predicate z 62 z, then y cannot exist on pain of contradiction.
Hence, if we admit a universal class we lose separation. However, it seems that
we need separation in order to comply with the following semantic principle:
For any domain of interpretation d and any predicate uðzÞ in the language, it
should be possible to specify an interpretation such that for all individuals
x 2 d, a predicate letter ‘P’ applies to x if and only if uðx=zÞ.
The problem emerges because in a model-theoretic semantics the semantic value of
‘P’ needs to be an object. In order that the above principle is satisfied, we need to
assign the class fz 2 d j uðzÞg to ‘P’. And this in turn requires the axiom of
separation.
I believe, however, that the quasi-Go¨delian strategy adopted in the present paper
allows us to formulate a satisfactory response to this objection.12 For suppose that
the domain of our interpretation consists of a class d, and let ‘P’ be a predicate
symbol that we want to interpret by a predicate in our language. If we take the idea
that every predicate (concept, propositional function) has a range of significance
seriously, then it seems reasonable to demand that a predicate be chosen that is
significant for all elements in d. I am not sure whether it is plausible to insist that it
must be possible to interpret ‘P’ by some predicate that is not significant for some
objects in the domain of interpretation. Indeed, the type-theoretic defense can be
seen as a special case of this. After all, Russell’s theory diverges from Go¨del’s only
insofar as a further condition is imposed on the ranges of significance, namely, that
they form types. (Recall our discussion in Sect. 4.) Hence we could replace the
above semantic principle by the following one:
For any domain of interpretation d and any predicate uðzÞ that is significant
for all objects in d, it should be possible to specify an interpretation such that
for all objects x 2 d, a predicate letter ‘P’ applies to x if and only if uðx=zÞ.
This demand can be met in the theory of classes presented in this paper. For if uðzÞ
is a predicate and d is a class such that all members of d are in the range of (the class
determined by) uðzÞ, then for all x 2 d we will have x 2 fz 2 d j uðzÞg if and only
if uðx=zÞ. Hence we can assign the class fz 2 d j uðzÞg as extension to the predicate
letter ‘P’.
How severe is the restriction imposed by the suggested principle? One may argue
about this, but I do not think that it is too severe. Notice, for instance, that whenever
the universe d contains only urelements, then any predicate in the language can be
12 An alternative approach is formulated in Linnebo (2006). The article describes a process whereby
more and more properties are ‘‘individuated’’. At any stage of this process, the semantic principle stated
above is validated because uðxÞ is understood in accordance with the notion of property application that
has been constructed by this stage. What cannot be done is to complete this process of property
individuation and then apply the semantic principle. But the article attempts (whether successfully or not)
to view this process as incompletable.
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assigned as interpretation to ‘P’. This still holds true if d contains, in addition, total
classes. Only if d contains classes that are non-total are we not free to choose
arbitrary predicates. (For example, if d contains the Russell class r, then we cannot
interpret ‘P’ by the Russell predicate u 62 u.) However, we can still assign to ‘P’ any
predicate that is total—such as the predicate x ¼ x.
7 Conclusion
I have listed a number of desiderata for a type-free theory of classes. Let us now see
how the theory proposed in this paper fares with respect to them. The main function
of class talk is that it enables us to generalize on predicate places in our language.
Second- and higher-order quantifiers provide a means to do so directly. Our class
theory can be used for the same purpose. For example, if our class theory is applied
to set theory, then we can express the axioms of separation and replacement by
single sentences. In addition, our theory allows us to generalize predicate places that
cannot be generalized in type theory.
Another possible application for a type-free theory of classes is to serve as a
foundation of category theory. In order to be applied like this, we need at least be
able to form the class of all sets and the class of all functions between sets, as well
as the power class of the class of all sets and the class of all functions between these
classes (see Muller 2001). This is possible if our class theory is combined with set
theory and the Axiom of Urelements is iterated in the way described. How
successful such a class-theoretic foundation of category theory is from a
philosophical point of view is, of course, a difficult question which demands
further discussion.
The problem of unrestricted quantification was cited as a main motive for a type-
free theory of classes. In the previous section, I have argued that the idea of limited
ranges of significance provides a response to one of the main objections against a
universal domain, namely, the problem of separation.
What about the reduction of properties (universals) to classes and the
corresponding analysis of natural language semantics? Obviously, this cannot be
answered unless we are given a formal theory of properties (universals). But I think
that the prospects here are not too bad either (assuming, of course, that one can deal
effectively with the problem that classes seem to be more coarse-grained than
classes, perhaps by following David Lewis’ strategy). For instance, consider the
property of being a property, which applies to all properties including itself. This
could be modelled by the class of all classes. There are good reasons to believe that
properties are closed under the algebraic operations corresponding to the logical
operations of negation, conjunction, etc. These operations can be performed on
classes as well. Moreover, consider again the inference from
1. Everything has the property of being self-identical
to
2. Socrates has the property of being self-identical
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and the inference from (1) to
3. The property of being red has the property of being self-identical
In our theory, both inferences can be carried out if talk of properties is appropriately
replaced by talk of classes.
Finally, we have seen that the pure theory of classes allows for an interpretation
of the second-order Dedekind–Peano axioms of arithmetic (i.e., Z2). If the theory is
extended with an appropriate axiom for forming total power classes of total classes,
it is even possible to interpret Zx, that is the union of n-th order arithmetic for every
n 2 x, which is roughly equivalent to Zermelo set theory (Zermelo–Fraenkel set
theory without replacement and foundation). What this means for the philosophy of
mathematics is an altogether different question. I have indicated that the naı¨ve
concept of class is acquired without significant epistemological presupposition, and
therefore might be used in a project similar to the Neo-Fregean one. But the
paradoxes force us to regiment the notion of class, and whether the regimentation
proposed here preserves the epistemological status of the naı¨ve notion is clearly in
need of further discussion. This, however, is left for another occasion.
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Appendix 1: Derivation of the Dedekind–Peano axioms
In this appendix we show that, given suitable definitions, the second-order
Dedekind–Peano axioms can be derived within the pure theory of classes. The proof
makes heavy use of the following theorem schemata, namely
8x ðtotalðxÞ ! ðx 2 fu j ug $ uðx=uÞÞÞ ðSOCÞ
and
8x ðx 2 fu j ug ! uðx=uÞÞ; ðOutÞ
both of which where discussed in Sect. 5.
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Definition 7.1 (Natural numbers.) Let 0 :¼£ and nþ 1 :¼ SðnÞ. Let
x :¼ fx j totalðxÞ ^ 8yð0 2 y ^ 8z 2 yðSðzÞ 2 yÞ ! x 2 yÞg
This is the usual von Neumann definition of finite ordinals; the only difference is
that we have smuggled the condition total(x) into the defining predicate. This allows
us to prove that x actually contains 0 and is closed under successor, and that
induction holds:
Proposition 7.2
1. 0 2 x ^ 8xðx 2 x! SðxÞ 2 xÞ
2. y  x ^ 0 2 y ^ 8z 2 x ðz 2 y ! SðzÞ 2 yÞ ! w  y
3. ðInductionÞuð0Þ ^ 8x 2 x ðuðxÞ ! uðSðxÞÞÞ ! 8x 2 xu:
Proof Ad 1. We already know that 0 is total. Since trivially 0 is a member of every
inductive class, (SOC) implies 0 2 x. Now let x 2 x. By (Out), x is total and a
member of every inductive class. It is easily seen that S(x) is also a member of every
inductive class. Moreover, we know that if x is total, then so is S(x). Thus by (SOC),
SðxÞ 2 x.
Ad 2. Let x 2 x to show that x 2 y. By (Out) we know that x is a member of
every inductive class. So it suffices to show that y is inductive. Obviously, 0 2 y.
Now let z 2 y. Since y  x also z 2 x. But then the third condition on y yields
SðzÞ 2 y. So y is inductive, we are done.
Ad 3. Consider a :¼ fx j x 2 x ^ uðxÞg. Note that x 2 a implies x 2 x by (Out).
So a  x. We will apply induction in the sense of the previous proposition (2).
Since 0 is total, from uð0Þ (and the fact that 0 2 x) we conclude 0 2 a by (SOC).
Now let y 2 x ^ y 2 a. By (Out), y is total and uðyÞ. By assumption, uðSðyÞÞ. Since
y is total, S(y) is total too. By (1) and y 2 x we conclude SðyÞ 2 x. Thus from
(SOC) and totality of S(y) we conclude SðyÞ 2 a. So by (2), x  a. So by (Out),
every member of x has the predicate u. h
The following propositions establish the transitivity and irreflexitivity of the
natural numbers. Here, x is transitive if and only if for all y 2 x, we have y  x.
Proposition 7.3
1. 8x 2 x ðxis transitiveÞ
2. 8x 2 x ðx 62 xÞ:
Proof Ad 1. By induction. 0 (which is the empty set) is obviously transitive.
Assume n 2 x, n transitive. Let y 2 x ^ x 2 nþ 1. By (Out), x 2 n _ x ¼ n. If x 2 n
then y 2 n by induction hypothesis (IH). If x ¼ n then also y 2 n. Thus y 2 n. By the
Axiom of Singularity, y is in the range of significance of n and therefore y is in the
range of significance of fz j z 2 ng by the Axiom of Membership. By the Axioms of
Identity and Connectives, y is also in range of fz j z 2 n _ z ¼ ng ¼: nþ 1. Then
y 2 n implies y 2 nþ 1.
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Ad 2. By induction. Obvious for x ¼ 0. Let n 2 x with n 62 n. Assume
nþ 1 2 nþ 1. Then nþ 1 2 n _ nþ 1 ¼ n by (Out). Also, by definition of nþ 1
and totality of n, n 2 nþ 1. But then n 2 n, contradicting the IH. h
Now we are in a position to prove the successor axioms:
Proposition 7.4
1. 8x 2 x ð0 6¼ xþ 1Þ
2. 8x; y 2 x ðxþ 1 ¼ yþ 1 ! x ¼ yÞ:
Proof Ad 1. Once can show that 0 has no elements but xþ 1 has at least one
element. Therefore they cannot be identical by Leibniz’ law.
Ad 2. Assume xþ 1 ¼ yþ 1. Then x 2 yþ 1 and y 2 xþ 1 (because x 2 xþ 1
and y 2 yþ 1). But then (applying the definition of successor and using the totality
of the natural numbers) ðx 2 y ^ y 2 xÞ _ x ¼ y. By Proposition 7.3(1),
x 2 x _ x ¼ y. So x ¼ y by Proposition 7.3(3). h
Finally, we show that comprehension holds.
Corollary 7.5 (Comprehension) For any u which does not contain y free, we have
9y  x 8x 2 x ðx 2 y $ uÞ.
Proof Let u be given. Let x 2 x. If x 2 fu j u 2 x ^ ug then uðx=uÞ by (Out) and
Conjunction Elimination. Conversely, if uðx=uÞ holds, then since x 2 x (which
implies totality of x) we get x 2 fu j u 2 x ^ ug by (SOC). Therefore, for all x,
x 2 fu j u 2 x ^ ug $ uðx=uÞ. Clearly, fu j u 2 x ^ ug  x. h
Notice that if x; y 2 x then the ordered pair (x, y) is total. (See our discussion in
the middle of Sect. 5.) A slight modification of the above proof shows that we can
also have comprehension for binary relations (indeed, n-ary relations) over natural
numbers. Hence, Dedekind’s famous result implies that our theory of classes
interprets full second-order arithmetic.
Appendix 2: Consistency proof
We will work in Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory with Urelements. The use of the
urelements can be eliminated but is assumed here for technical convenience. Before
starting with the formal construction of the model, let me sketch the underlying idea
(without laying claim to completeness or accuracy).
The domain of our model will consist of all sets of rank 6 x that can be
constructed in the cumulative hierarchy starting with a countable set of urelements.
Hence, the set of natural numbers and each of its subsets live within the model.
There are four subsets of the domain that will be relevant: (1) the urelements; (2) the
finite sets; (3) the co-finite sets; (4) the infinite sets that are not co-finite. The objects
in category (1)–(3) will represent the total classes, the sets in category (4) will
represent the non-total or proper classes. The range of significance of a total class
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will consist of the entire domain; the range of a proper class will consist of the set of
total classes. In other words, the singularities of a proper class will comprise all and
only the proper classes. Therefore, the Axiom of Circularity will be true in this
model. We will associate (identify) each set in category (3) with exactly one
urelement. Self-membership is then achieved by stipulating that a class is contained
in itself iff it contains the urelement associated with it.
Now let us consider the Axiom of Class Comprehension. This axiom states that,
for every predicate uðxÞ, the class associated with that predicate comprises exactly
those objects that are in the range of uðxÞ and satisfy uðxÞ. In particular, given how
we have defined the ranges of significance in our model, if uðxÞ is not total, then the
class associated with it must comprise exactly the total classes satisfying uðxÞ. But
any collection of total classes can be represented by a collection of finite sets,
because every co-finite set is represented by an urelement. Since such a collection
has rank 6 x, it lives within our model, and we will use it to validate the Axiom of
Class Comprehension.
Moreover, it is easy to see that, in this model, the total classes are closed under all
relevant algebraic operations postulated by the axioms: for example, they are closed
under complementation because the complement of a finite set is a co-finite set and
vice versa; they are closed under singletons because the singleton of a finite set is
finite, and the singleton of a co-finite set will be represented by the singleton of the
urelement associated with it, which is a finite set as well.
In this short sketch of the main idea, I have swept several problems under the rug,
and we need to make certain adjustments in order to deal with them. In particular,
according to the Axiom of Extensionality, there may be co-extensional classes that
are not identical because they do not have the same range of significance. In order to
deal with this problem, we will have to add copies of the finite and co-finite sets to
our model and declare them to be non-total. Secondly, we need to allow proper
classes to be elements of total classes. However, proper classes can have rank x,
and there are no objects in our domain of rank xþ 1. For cardinality reasons, it is
not possible to introduce an urelement for each proper class that could serve as its
proxy. Fixing this problem makes the proof more complicated.
We will now start with the formal construction. Let U be a countably infinite set
of urelements. Let t, p be two urelements not contained in U. Let
UT ¼ fðu; tÞ j u 2 Ug. The objects in UT will be used to model membership
between classes of equal rank. Let Vx½UT  be the smallest set X that
(a) UT  X, and
(b) whenever x1; . . .; xn 2 X then ðfx1; . . .; xng; tÞ 2 X The collection of total
classes, T, consists of all x such that
1. x 2 Vx½UT , or
2. 9y1; . . .; yn 2 Vx½UT  such that
x ¼ ðVx½UT  n fy1; . . .; yng; tÞ
Note that the objects satisfying (1) have finite rank and that the ones satisfying (2)
are such that their first components are co-finite in Vx½UT .
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The collection of proper (i.e., non-total) classes, P, consists of all x such that
3. x ¼ ðy; pÞ for some y  Vx½UT 
The domain, D, of our model, consists of T [ P. Notice that, as I said above,
P contains a ‘copy’ of each finite and co-finite set.
Given an object x ¼ ða; iÞ 2 D with i 2 ft; pg, we call a the set-component of x
and i the index of x. If the set-component of x is an urelement, we call (by abuse of
language) x itself an urelement. We let r1ðða; iÞÞ ¼ a. Given x; y 2 D, we write
x 21 y if and only if x is an element of the set-component of y, that is if and only if
x 2 r1ðyÞ. Observe that x 21 y can only obtain if x has finite rank.
The ranges of significance are defined as follows. If x is total, i.e., if x 2 T , then
the range of x consists of the entire domain, D, that is, yRx iff y 2 D. If x is not total,
i.e., if x 2 P, then the range of x consists of the set of total classes, T, that is, yRx iff
y 2 T . So there are only two different kinds of ranges. This definition ensures that
the Axiom of Circularity is true on our model:
Proposition 7.6 8x 2 D ð9y 2 D: xRy ! 9z 2 D: zRxÞ:
Proof Let x 2 D and assume that there is a y 2 D such that : xRy. By definition of
R, this implies that x 2 P (for if x were in T, x would be R-related to every y 2 D).
But if x 2 P, then x is R-related to all and only the the objects in T. Since P is non-
empty, there must be a z 2 P such that : zRx. h
Let D be the set of all total classes with infinite rank (i.e., the co-finite sets) and
let f be a bijection between D and UT . We define a relation on our domain D that
will serve as our interpretation for identity between classes. Let x  y iff x ¼ y or
x ¼ f ðyÞ or y ¼ f ðxÞ. That is, two objects are equivalent iff they are either identical
or one is the urelement associated with the other. (Notice that the last two cases can
only occur when both objects are total and one of them is co-finite.) Clearly,  is an
equivalence relation.
Next we define a binary relation E on D that will serve as our interpretation for
class membership. We will make sure that x and f(x) turn out to be co-extensional in
the sense of E (whenever x is total). We will achieve self-membership by stipulating
that xEx iff f ðxÞ 21 x, that is, if the set-component of x contains the urelement
associated with x. Note that, according to our axioms, while proper classes may be
self-membered, only total classes are forced to be. We will produce a ‘minimal’
model in which only total classes will be self-membered. Indeed, we will produce a
model in which no proper class contains any other proper class. (Again, while our
axioms allow that proper classes contain proper classes, they don’t force it.) E is
defined as follows.
If x; y 2 P then : xEy.
If x 2 P and y 2 T n ðD [ UTÞ then : xEy.
If x 2 P and y 2 D then xEy and xEf(y).
If x 2 T then xEy if and only if
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x 21 y _ x 21 f1ðyÞ _ f ðxÞ 21 y _ f ðxÞ 21 f1ðyÞ
In words: in our model, no proper classes is E-contained in any other proper class. A
proper class is never contained in any finite total class. Every proper class is E-
contained in any infinite total class and in their corresponding urelements. Finally, if
x is total, then x is an E-member of y iff the set-component of x (or its corresponding
urelement, if it exists) is an 2-member of the set-component of y (or of the (infinite)
set corresponding to y, if y is an urlement).
Now it is easily seen that the Axiom of Singularity holds in our model.
Proposition 7.7 8x; y 2 D ð: xRy ! : xEyÞ:
Proof If x is not in the range of y then y is a proper class. But since x is not
contained in some range, it must be a proper class too. However, if x; y 2 P then
: xEy by definition of E. h
Moreover, the definitions so far ensure that the Axiom of Extensionality is true in
our model.
Proposition 7.8 8x; y 2 D ðRðxÞ ¼ RðyÞ ^ 8z 2 D ðzEx $ zEyÞ ! x  yÞ:
Proof Assume that the antecedent holds. Then either both x, y are total or both are
proper. There are several cases to distinguish.
Assume first that neither x nor y are urelements. It is sufficient to show that the
set components of x, y are identical, i.e., that 8z ðz 21 x $ z 21 yÞ. Let z 21 x.
Clearly then, z has finite rank. Hence z 2 Vx½UT . So, z is total. Thus we can deduce
zEx. By assumption, zEy as well. Since y is not an urelement, this means that z 21 y
or f ðzÞ 21 y. The latter cannot obtain because f(z) is undefined as z is either an
urelement or a total class of finite rank. Thus z 21 y. The argument for the other
direction is completely symmetrical.
If x is an urelement but y is not, one can run a similar argument to show that
x ¼ f ðyÞ. If both x, y are urelements, one can run a similar argument to show that
f1ðxÞ ¼ f1ðyÞ. h
The following proposition states that two objects that are treated as equal are E-
contained in the same objects.
Proposition 7.9 8x; y; z 2 Dðx  y ^ xEz ! yEzÞ:
Proof If x ¼ y this is trivial. So assume w.l.o.g. that x ¼ f ðyÞ, which means that x
is an urelement and both x, f(x) are total. The definition of xEz implies x 21 z or
x 21 f1ðzÞ or f ðxÞ 21 y or f ðxÞ 21 f1ðyÞ. The third and fourth disjunct cannot
obtain since x is an urelement and so f(x) is not defined. Hence (since x ¼ f ðyÞ) we
have f ðyÞ 21 z or f ðyÞ 21 f1ðzÞ. By definition of E, yEz. h
Let L be the language of our class theory. In order to distinguish the membership
symbol of L from that of our metatheory (ZF), we will denote the former by e. If u
is an L-formula without any class abstracts, let u be obtained from u by replacing
all occurrences of x e y by xEy, all occurrences of x ¼ y by x  y, and all
occurrences of 8xw by 8x 2 Dw.
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Let us check that the law of substitutivity holds:
Proposition 7.10 If u is a formula of L then 8x; y 2 D ðx  y ^ uðxÞ ! uðyÞÞ:
Proof By induction on the build up of u. If uðxÞ is of the form x  s then this
follows from the fact that  is an equivalence relation. If uðxÞ is of the form xEs
this follows from Proposition 7.9.
Let uðxÞ be of the form sEx . The claim is trivial if x ¼ y. So assume w.l.o.g.
that y ¼ f ðxÞ, so y is an urelement and both y, x are total (x has infinite rank). If
s 2 P then the claim follows immediately from the definition of E. So assume s 2 T .
Then sEx implies s 21 x or s 21 f1ðxÞ or f ðsÞ 21 x or f ðsÞ 21 f1ðxÞ. We can
exclude the second and fourth disjunct (because if f(x) is defined, f1ðxÞ is not
defined). Hence s 21 x or f ðsÞ 21 x. Since x ¼ f1ðyÞ, we have s 21 f1ðyÞ or
f ðsÞ 21 f1ðyÞ, hence sEy by definition of E.
If uðxÞ is of the form xRs or sRx this follows from the definition of R. The other
clauses follow from the induction hypothesis. h
In order to finish the specification of our model, we need to interpret the class
abstracts. This is done in a two-step construction. In the first step, we define an
interpretation for all class abstracts that our axiomatic theory of classes proves to be
total. In a second step, we extend this interpretation to cover the remaining class
abstracts. For sake of simplicity, we assume that L contains :;^ as its only logical
connectives.
First step First, we need to capture the set of class abstracts that our axiomatic
theory proves to be total. We’ll call them p-terms. They are defined by the following
simultaneous recursive definition:
1. u ¼ u 2 p and fu j u ¼ ug 2 p
2. If s 2 p then u ¼ s 2 p and fu j u ¼ sg 2 p
3. If s 2 p then u e s 2 p and fu j u e sg 2 p
4. If u 2 p then :u 2 p and fu j :ug 2 p
5. If u;w 2 p then u ^ w 2 p and fu j u ^ wg 2 p
6. Nothing else is a p-term.
Now we define a mapping (interpretation) þ of the set of p-terms into our domain D.
In fact, notice that þ maps the p-terms into T.
1. fu j u ¼ ugþ ¼ ðVx½UT ; tÞ
2. fu j u ¼ sgþ ¼ ðfsþg; tÞ
3. fu j u e sgþ ¼ sþ
4. fu j :ugþ ¼ ðVx½UT  n r1ðfu j ugþÞ; tÞ
5. fu j u ^ wgþ ¼ ðr1ðfu j ugþÞ \ r1ðfu j wgþÞ; tÞ
Second step We extend þ to an interpretation that maps all class abstracts of L into
D. In order to cope with parameters that may occur in a class abstract, we will
augment L with a constant term for each object in D that is not in the range of the
function þ. If a is such an object, we write a for the corresponding constant and let
aþ ¼ a.
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We recursively expand þ as follows. Let uðu; y1; . . .; ynÞ be a L-formula with all
free variables displayed and containing no class abstracts or individual constants.
Let s1; . . .; sn be a sequence of class terms or individual constants (of lower
complexity than u) and assume that sþ1 ; . . .; s
þ
n 2 D are already defined. We define
the interpretation for fu j uðu; s1; . . .; snÞg as follows. If fu j uðu; s1; . . .; snÞg is a p-
term, then fu j uðu; s1; . . .; snÞgþ is defined as above. Otherwise, we let fu j
uðu; s1; . . .; snÞgþ be the set
ðfu 2 Vx½UT  j uðu; sþ1 ; . . .; sþn Þg; pÞ
Note that this is well-defined, i.e., ðfu 2 Vx½UT  j uðu; sþ1 ; . . .; sþn Þg; pÞ 2 D,
because the set-component is a subset of Vx½UT .
Now we are in a position to show that the Axiom of Class Comprehension holds
in our model.
Proposition 7.11 Let uðu; y1; . . .; ynÞ by a formula of L and s1; . . .; sn be a
sequence of class abstracts or individual constants. Assume
dRfu j uðu; s1; . . .; snÞgþ. Then
dEfu j uðu; s1; . . .; snÞgþ $ uðd; sþ1 ; . . .; sþn Þ
Proof Let c :¼ fu j uðu; s1; . . .; snÞg. Assume first that c is not a p-term. Hence
cþ ¼ ðfu 2 Vx½UT  j uðu; sþ1 ; . . .; sþn Þg; pÞ
Assume first that dEcþ. Since cþ 2 P, the definition of E implies d 2 T . By defi-
nition of E we have d 21 cþ or d 21 f1ðcþÞ or f ðdÞ 21 cþ or f ðdÞ 21 f1ðcþÞ. The
second and fourth case can be ruled out because f1ðcþÞ is undefined as cþ is a
proper class. If d 21 cþ, the definition of cþ implies uðd; sþ1 ; . . .; sþn Þ. If f ðdÞ 21 cþ,
then uðf ðdÞ; sþ1 ; . . .; sþn Þ. Since d  f ðdÞ, Proposition 7.10 implies
uðd; sþ1 ; . . .; sþn Þ.
For the other direction, assume uðd; sþ1 ; . . .; sþn Þ. Assume w.l.o.g. that d has
finite rank, i.e., d 2 Vx½UT  (if not, we can work with f(d) and rely on Proposition
7.10). Then by definition of cþ we can deduce d 21 c and therefore dEc.
Now assume that c is a p-term. Hence cþ 2 T . We prove the claim by induction
on the complexity of a p-term. We only show two cases and leave the rest to the
reader.
1. Assume that u has the form u ¼ u. Hence u has the form u  u. Of course
this holds for any object in D. Moreover, cþ ¼ ðVx½UT ; tÞ. Since the set-component
of cþ is infinite, we have dEcþ for any d 2 P by definition of E. Moreover, it is
easily checked that dEcþ for any d 2 T .
2. Let us check that xEfu j u ^ wgþ iff uðxÞ ^ wðxÞ. Note that fu j ug; fu j wg
must be p-terms as well. Assume first that x 2 P. (The case x 2 T is proved in a
similar way.) Assume xEfu j u ^ wgþ. Then fu j u ^ wgþ must be co-finite and
hence both fu j ugþ; fu j wgþ must be co-finite as well. Therefore, by definition of
E, xEfu j ugþ and xEfu j wgþ. By induction hypothesis uðxÞ ^ wðxÞ. The other
direction follows by a similar argument. h
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Next, we verify the the Axiom of Negation.
Proposition 7.12 8x 2 D ðxRfu j ugþ ! xRfu j :ugþÞ:
Proof If fu j ug is a p-term, then so is fu j :ug. Hence both fu j ugþ; fu j :ugþ
are in T and therefore have the same range of significance. Similarly, if fu j ug is
not a p-term, then neither is fu j :ug, hence both fu j ugþ; fu j :ugþ are in P and
therefore have the same range of significance. h
Note that the above argument shows that we can strengthen the Axiom of
Negation to a biconditional. In a similar manner, one proves the Axioms of
Connectives, the Axiom of Identity, and the Axiom of Membership. Finally, we
check the Axiom of Self-Identity.
Proposition 7.13 8x 2 DxRfu j u ¼ ugþ:
Proof By definition, fu j u ¼ ugþ ¼ ðVx½UT ; tÞ 2 T . Hence any object in D is in
the range of it. h
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